Tentative Book of Abstracts

from the short papers section
Abstracts included:

Michael Bakker (ACEOT - VU Amsterdam)
A Tale of Two Cities: the Tripartite Soul in Plato and St Maximos

Emma C J Brown (Durham Univ.)
The Ontology of Virtue in St Maximus the Confessor’s Cosmology

Dorothy Chang (Columbia Univ.)
Freedom and Free Will through a Trinitarian and Christological Lens in Maximus’ Ambigua

Dan Chitoiu (Alexandru Ioan Cuza Univ. of Iasi)
From Logos to Logoi: Maximus the Confessor as Key Figure in Shaping the European Idea of World’s Rationality

Fr. Maximos Constas (Simonopetra Monastery, Mount Athos)
"A Greater and More Hidden Word":Maximos the Confessor and the Ontology of Language

Vladimir Cvetkovic (Univ. of Belgrade)
The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor

Natalie Depraz (Université de Rouen)
The philosophy of negation in Maximus the Confessor between negative theology and apophaticism

Nevena Dimitrova (Charles University in Prague)
Human Knowledge in St. Maximus the Confessor (What is wisdom and how heksis and gnomi determine the way of human knowledge?)

Elena Giannakopoulou (Univ. of Athens)
Testimonies of Ecumenical Councils on St. Maximus the Confessor

Demetrios Harper (Univ. of Winchester)
Autexousion as Assent or Actuality? Compatibilism, Natural Law, and the Maximian Synthesis

Michael Harrington (Duquesne Univ.)
The Contemplation of Nature as Spiritual Exercise in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua

Myroslav Hryshko (Ljubljana)
Political Eschatology of the Natural and Gnomic Will
Cullan Joyce (MCD Univ. Melbourne)
The Metaphysics of Thelema in Maximus the Confessor: Discussing Possible Transcendental Themes

Karolina Kochańczyk – Bonińska (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski Univ. in Warsaw)
The philosophical basis of Maximus’ concept of sexes. The reasons and purposes of the distinction between woman and man

Joshua Lollar (Univ. of Kansas)
Maximus the Confessor and the Consciousness of Time

Nicholas Marinides (Univ. of Basel)
Maximus the Confessor and the care of souls

Smilen Markov (St. Cyril and St. Methodius Univ. of Veliko Tarnovo)
Relation as marker of historicity in the thought of St. Maximos Confessor

Sebastian Mateiescu (Univ. of Bucharest)
The six-category ontology of Saint Maximus the Confessor

Sotiris Mitralexis (Freie Univ. Berlin)
Time, Aeon, Ever-Moving Repose: A threefold theory of temporality

Alexei Nesteruk (Univ. of Portsmouth)
The Liturgical Constitution of Creation in a Phenomenological Interpretation of St Maximus the Confessor’s Mystagogy

Jack Pappas (Boston College)
Otherwise than Identity, or Beyond Difference: St. Maximus the Confessor and the hypostatic-transfigurement of fundamental ontology

Marius Portaru (Patristic Institute Augustinianum)
The Soul-Body Problem in Late Antiquity: Maximus’ re-working of Nemesius’ Neoplatonic attempted solution

Douglas Auld Shepardson (Fordham Univ.)
Maximus and Socrates on Trial: a Historic-Literary Consanguinity of Rebellion

Dionisios Skliris (Univ. Paris IV-Sorbonne)
The philosophical significance of the dialectic between reason (logos), mode (tropos) and end (telos) in a postmodern context

George Steiris (Univ. of Athens)
Maximus the Confessor and al-Farabi on imagination

Alexandru Szabo (KU Leuven)
Approaching philosophy, disclosing theology: Maximus Confessor’s Epistula VI
Nichifor Tănase (Eftimie Murgu Univ. of Resita)
The luminous garment of Christ and the uncreated, enhypostatic light. Maximus a pre-Palamitic Palamist?

Stoyan Tanev (Univ. of Southern Denmark)
Man as co-creator: reflections on the theological insights of St Maximus the Confessor within a contemporary interdisciplinary context

Antonio Vargas (Humboldt Univ. Berlin)
A Contribution of Maximus’ Theory of Time to First Philosophy

Anna Zhyrkova & Marcin Podbielski (Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie)
Hypostasis in Maximus: an Expression, a Term, a Theory - Part A
St Maximos the Confessor was asked by Thalasssius how to interpret κατὰ θεωρίαν the Old Testament narrative about king Hezekiah blocking off the waters from the springs outside Jerusalem (2 Par = 2 Chr 32: 2–4). In his exegesis in Q.Thal 49, Maximos draws a picture of Jerusalem as the soul, king Hezekiah as its (spiritual) intellect (νοῦς) and his three chief court officials as the thinking power (λογιστικὸν), desiring power (ἐπιθυμητικὸν) and incensive power (θημικὸν) of the soul. Also elsewhere, Maximos interprets a threesome often as the these psychic faculties, so they form an important part of his thinking. Without explicitly mentioning Plato, Maximos conjures up the image of the tripartite soul as three classes of inhabitants (Republic, iv: 434D–441C). What are the differences between both cities? What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?

Maximos plays an important role in the development of a (Greek) Patristic psychology, drawing on Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers. Throughout his writings, Maximos frequently mentions the three powers of the soul and analyses, amongst others, their relation to virtues and vices and to the intellect (νοῦς). He underlines that the soul can use the powers in a positive or a negative way, depending on its intention (γνώμη), disposition (διάθεσις) and habits (ἐξετας). And, typically, Maximos stresses that the λογιστικὸν, ἐπιθυμητικὸν and θημικὸν are by nature good. All depends on how a free person employs his or her will to use them.

Maximos’ approach is deeply practical and eclectic. His concern is to encourage a God-pleasing way of life rather than building his own system of philosophy. Philosophia ancilla theologiae: ethical philosophy or praxis prepares the way for theoria, which may lead to mystical theology. Because Maximos’ philosophy is so grounded in experience, the psychological insights which seem to appear as by-products in his writings may be of practical use for modern man.
In this paper I propose that virtue, for St Maximus the Confessor, has ontological status by merit of its participation in love. My interest in asking what a virtue is for Maximus arises from the recent papers that present him as relevant to the field of contemporary virtue ethics (Louth, Blowers, Papanikolaou). I think the ontology of virtue as held by Maximus may well be a particular asset to this field. I posit that virtue is something we can consider to be real only in lieu of it being an activity partaking in love. The way virtues partake in love is explained in this paper through Maximus’ description of the logoi and Logos. I posit that the relationship of virtue to love is identical to that of the logoi and the Logos, and that in explicitly making this claim we can make radical and more clear statements about what virtue is for Maximus and what is meant by its participation in love. We can for example, reconcile it with the circle and radii image that Cvetkovic proposed be used as an analogy for the arrangement and movement of the logoi in St Maximus’ works. This paper therefore has two related purposes: firstly, to establish that virtue for Maximus has ontological status by merit of its participation in love, and secondly, to establish the former premise by identifying the relationship of the Logos and logoi with that of love and virtue.
For Maximus, communion and otherness coincide in his ontology, and it is only through otherness that there can be freedom. The divine Logos unites the logoi of creation to him. This shows that becoming united, creation maintains its creaturely nature without becoming a part of God's substance. In this way, Maximus is able to overcome a Greek “monistic ontology” which seeks to eliminate otherness, and subsequently, freedom. In Maximus there is the possibility of looking at an ontological way a creature can relate to the divine without denying an ontological otherness. By differentiating between tropos and logos, Maximus writes that the divine Logos bridges the gap between God and the world through the hypostatic union. God's love bridges the gap between otherness by adjusting his tropos, or his mode of being. I hope to look at the difference between free will, which is often related to nature, and freedom, which is often related to personhood. I would also hope to look at how a person can both be free and united with God at once. I will primarily be looking at the Ambigua and focusing on the subtle differences between eleutheria and autexousia. Furthermore, I would like to look at natural will and the gnomic will, which is the difficulty of deliberation. I am primarily looking into the Trinitarian problem and how the only way to maintain otherness and communion by understanding personhood as a mode of being.
From *Logos to Logoi*: Maximus the Confessor as Key Figure in Shaping the European Idea of World`\textquotesingle`s Rationality

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**Abstract** This paper aims to evaluate the significance gave to *world`\textquotesingle;s rationality* at some key moments in the history of European thought. A series of explanations for the world`\textquotesingle;s meaning, between *the harmony of opposites* to *the indefinite virtualities* were provided from Heraclitus to Maximus the Confessor. These paradigms of representation are still present today in various shapes, with important consequences in understanding the world, both at the macrocosmic and microcomic levels. Now it is obvious that not only philosophy but as much science are constantly placed in the need to provide modelations for explaining reality. Maximus` vision about indefinite virtualities offers a much more complex explanation about how the reality *is not*, but is in a constant and varying process of forming, a process depending also on a subtile interaction with human. This is the reason why this explanation model is much more usefull now, when science demonstrates that, at least at the quantum level, the interaction between matter and human mind is a fact.
Maximos the Confessor’s *Ambigua to John* is marked by sustained interest in the nature of language, incorporating elements from Gregory the Theologian, Dionysios the Areopagite, and Neoplatonic commentaries on the works of Aristotle. In his efforts to clarify Gregory’s responses to the logical and linguistic arguments of second-wave Arianism, Maximos drew largely on Dionysios and the later philosophical Commentators, producing a complex, Christian philosophy of language that calls for greater exploration and study.

Whereas theories of language are not independent of cosmology and anthropology in any of Maximos’ antecedent sources, the three terms are uniquely woven together in the *Ambigua to John*. The Confessor’s cosmos is a thoroughly linguistic—and thoroughly textual—reality, in which Scripture and creation are seen (and “read”) as two “books,” two discursive unfoldings of the transcendent Word. Within this cosmos, the supreme signum is the Word, who has imprinted himself equally in the forms of nature and in the letters of Scripture. Through actual physical embodiment in this world, the Word becomes a “sign” of himself; both signifier and signified, recapitulating (insofar as he uniformly pre-contains) the multiform meanings of all that can be expressed in thought and language.

In articulating these notions, Maximos appears to have closely followed traditional Platonic analogies, constructing a two-tiered universe in which material realities, including language, are sensible representations of what is truly present in the realm of intellect, so that language re-presents the discursive, temporal unfolding of an eternal world known through the immediacy of “theoria.” However, Maximos grounds these correspondences in a dynamic, eschatological framework, thereby redefining Platonic anagogy through Christian eschatology. Placed in the irreducibly historical and progressively forward-looking framework of “shadow, icon, and truth,” language continues to be inherently transitive, functioning as a system of deferrals. Yet what language signifies is no longer to be found in a realm of “higher” reality, of which language is merely a “lower” reflection or instantiation. Instead, the “mirror” of language (like the universe) is turned toward the future advent of a “greater and more hidden Word” (*Amb. 21*). In this way, Maximos’s radical redefinition of *kinesis* enacts an equally radical reorientation of language. Like all created reality, language is a sign and symptom of motion, a forward-moving image of realities that are themselves the effects of a cause, which will be fully disclosed only in the future, when motion and time will have reached their natural limits.
The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor
by Vladimir Cvetkovic

Abstract:
The paper attempts to show that Maximus identifies the oneness of God with the unity of divine persons. In this paper I argue that Maximus refers to God as the Truth by his essence, the Good by his energy, the One by subsisting in Trinity and the Unique by his Incarnation (Myst. 5), by relying on Dionysius the Areopagite’s definition of God as ‘united unity’, ‘differentiated unity’, ‘united differentiations’ and ‘differentiated differentiations’ (DN 2).

Maximus’ development of the idea of one God on the basis of the unity of divine persons worth being explored as it stands in contrast with the modern Trinitarian perspective that roots the oneness of God in the concept of common essence.

In dealing with this topic, this paper investigates Maximus’ argumentations on three levels: a) historical, against the backdrop of Tritheism, that occurred in the seventh century in connection with Monoenergism, b) philosophical, in connection with a possible resemblance to Neoplatonic process or movement, that begins in a simple and ineffable Monad and ends in an appearance of the Son of God in body and c) epistemological, in regard to the hypothesis that human reasoning is structured to acknowledge God not on the basis of His existence, but rather on the mode (τρόπος) of His subsistence.
The philosophy of negation in Maximus the Confessor between negative theology and apophaticism

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Summary

When you broach the issue of negation in theology, you straightforward address the central approach of negative theology, which is in turn often equated with apophaticism. In this contribution I would like to show how Maximus the Confessor remarkably helps distinguishing between negative theology and apophaticism precisely thanks to his highly philosophical discrimination between the essence (ousia) of God and its energies/operations (energiai). Indeed for Maximus the essence of God (ousia) is absolutely unknowable because of its imparticipable character, whereas it is participable to the human being through its energies. I would like to investigate the specific philosophical character of such a « theoria of essence and energies », which is so peculiar to the so-called Eastern Orthodox thought and was hardly noticed and dealt with by Western theologians and a fortiori philosophers. Why is it important? Because such a theoria formalizes the Gregorian experiential distinction between mystical and symbolical theology and dialectizes the Dionysian remanent duality between affirmative and negative theology. While inheriting the Platonic theoria of the koinonia of generic forms he gives way to two different meanings of negation, one that is relative, linked to the participation of the human being to God through His energies, the other that is absoluté: the wholly imparticipation of the essence of God. Thanks to such a theoria the relationship between God and the human being becomes less dual than an experiential circulation and an operative double-directed dynamics of moving-growing human beings towards God and of providing a unbridging space for God. In the end such a theoria helps understanding why a
genuine philosophy needs to anchor its conceptual intellectual formalisation upon an experiential dynamics and not the reverse. It is also here that Maximus as a protophenomenologist operates to open up the experiential distinction between «negative theology» as an intellectual understanding, and apophaticism, its experiential guiding.
Human Knowledge According to Maximus the Confessor

(What is wisdom and how heksis and gnomi determine the way of human knowledge?)

Nevena Dimitrova

My aim is to present Maximus the Confessor views on human knowledge in the context of the early Byzantine philosophy. Most of the Maximus’ connoisseurs argue that in his person we witness the birth of new forms of philosophy and science. He is not merely receiver of a monolithic pagan and Christian tradition, but innovative, critical interpreter of the range and limits of cognitive psychology, the soul-body relation, reflexive self-knowledge, personal and human identity and the soul’s practical relation to goodness in the context of human experience and divine self-disclosure.

In my presentation I am going to explore Maximus the Confessor’s views on human knowledge by examining the cognitive capacities of the soul - sense perception, rational activity and the operation of the mind. These different, yet interrelated parts of human ascent in knowledge are constitutive for the movement of the trichotomic cognitive structure inherited from Evagrius and largely recast by Maximus, namely: practical philosophy (pr©xij), natural contemplation (fusik» qewria) and mystical theology (mustik» qeologίa). I will examine the Aristotelean influence on his understanding of hexis (ἕȟις) and the innovative view of gnomi (γȞώȝη): two of the ‘human’ conditions for opening the door for divine-human communion in the achievement of human knowledge of God. Goodness and Truth as limits of operations of reason and mind respectively will be explored in the context of ancient philosophical tradition coming from Plato and Aristotle.

The engagement of all the intellective energy in terms of becoming not bigger, but better is at the core in the teaching of Maximus and other patristic thinkers. This urge to turn back to the way human nature has been understood is a result of the basic question of meaning of the existence. Where if not in the frames of knowledge possible for humans, can we endure the answer? Thus the gnoseological problem opens the door for incorporating patristic thought in modern philosophical thought.
ABSTRACT

Testimonies of Ecumenical Councils on St. Maximus the Confessor

Dr. Elena Giannakopoulou

Certain scholars have noted that the name of St. Maximus is not acknowledged in the official documents (acta, transcripts) of the Sixth Ecumenical Council/Third Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (680-681 A.D.). Indeed, nowhere in the transcripts of that Ecumenical Council is there any explicit reference to St. Maximus. However, several points in the official documents testify indirectly but clearly to the influence of the thought and terminology of St. Maximus, particularly as regards dogmatic theology that developed on the basis of the principle of two wills and two energies (divine and human) in Jesus Christ. Using selectively the critical edition of the transcripts of this Council, published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (R. Riedinger, 1992), we will present some indicative excerpts referring to the writings of St. Maximus. Furthermore, approximately a century later, an explicit reference to his name is testified in the official documents of the Seventh Ecumenical Council/Second Ecumenical Council of Nicaea (787 A.D.). In the minds of the Nicaean Fathers and in accordance with passages detected in the transcripts of that Council, Maximus is referred to as "saint" and "blessed", ranking among prominent Church Fathers (such as St. Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Sophronius of Jerusalem, et.al.) who had supported the use of images, the cross, etc. in the tradition of the Christian Orthodox Church.

From the above it becomes evident that the thoughts and terminology of Maximus on the above mentioned issues were developed soon after his lifetime, in the course of the following two Ecumenical Councils (680/681, 787), acquiring not only at a European, but an ecumenical - international value, as the participants of these Councils originated from various parts of the then known Christian world.
As the late Michael Frede notes in his *A Free Will*, the idea of an *autexousion* human being enters the western philosophical vocabulary via the Stoics, and was generously appropriated both terminologically and notionally by subsequent generations of philosophers and theologians. An agent capable of freely acting on his or her own initiative came to comprise, and indeed remains, the core of most Christian approaches to human action and morality. Despite the rather broad and historically-extended acceptance of the notion of a free-determining rational being, it has remained rather unclear as to what extent we are able to self-legislate in the face of determinative natural laws, whether divinely ordained or materially necessitated. The Stoics themselves opted for a rather minimalistic approach to the difficulty, suggesting what is now termed as a compatibilistic approach to human action. As Epictetus argues, all human determination is entirely of an internal character, having no actual affect upon the natural laws of the cosmos or the demiurge’s predetermined intention. A human moral determination is, therefore, judged in terms of whether or not it constitutes a psychological assent to the demiurge’s natural dictates, and a passive acknowledgement of an imperative. This compatibilistic approach would later be adopted and reintegrated by thinkers like Immanuel Kant, leading to what many now consider to be a morality of solipsism, in which all moral and ethical concerns become entirely self-referential. The goal of this paper, broadly speaking, is to present St. Maximus the Confessor’s mode of thinking as an alternative to internalized, Kantian-style approaches to self-determination. As I shall argue, Maximus’ rather unique views of natural law enable him to endorse a rationally ordered and divinely determined cosmos, yet also preserve natural self-determination. Though displaying the abundant use of Stoic terminology, the Confessor’s synthesis seems to suggest that the human subject is provided with the inherent capacity to act upon nature. Consequently, a rational being is capable of decisive engagement with both the Creator and other members of his or her species, not merely assenting to, but co-constituting the divinely determined fulfillment of human nature’s end through the actualization of virtue.
In his book-length essay on what it means to be European, Rémi Brague notes that, as a child, he was “fascinated by the knick-knacks on sale along the coast or in the mountains in which one drowned in translucent plastic, according to the case, a sea horse or an edelweiss.” The solid plastic prevents anyone from unmediated contact with the object, but it is transparent and supports the object on all sides, and so it also presents the object to the observer. Brague calls this model of receiving foreign objects “inclusion,” and when applied not to seahorses but to texts and cultures, he takes it to be distinctively European. Though Brague does not identify this model of reception as objective, we will find that its adoption is necessary to what we now call “scientific objectivity,” and that it applies as much to natural objects as to texts and cultures. That is, the child who looks at a seahorse encased in plastic is not wholly different from the scientist who studies the seahorse. To get a better sense of why this is the case, we may look at one of the more vocal early proponents of natural contemplation, the seventh-century Byzantine monk Maximus the Confessor. In the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, in particular, but also in the *Liber Ambiguorum*, Maximus develops a practice of natural contemplation distinct from both sensory and ecstatic experience, and which belongs to the tradition that is later responsible for the modern practice of scientific objectivity.
Although there is no doctrinal formulation of eschatology in Orthodoxy, the anti-soteriological character of the gnomic will entails an eschatological dimension. The gnomic will is that which is overcome in theosis and ultimately extinguished in absolute soteriological parousia. If Christ is, according to Florovsky’s gloss of St. Maximus, “the heart of the world existence – not only in terms of redemption, but also in terms of the creation of the world”,¹ the Confessor’s rejection of the gnomic will in Christ at once abstracts the fallen creation as the reign of the gnomic will. Natural will as the properly human will of Christ is decisive to the (eschatological) theosis that opposes the fallen state of creation.

The political eschatology of liberalism is an ideology of the gnomic will. The philosophical foundations of liberalism are anticipated in St. Maximus’ account of the gnomic will as “the self-chosen impulse and movement of reason to one thing or another.”² The conceptual history of liberalism defines man in terms of the individualism of putatively autonomous, atomised choice (e.g., democratic choice, the economy of the free market); the perpetuation of this image of man becomes the objective of its political programs. Insofar as the gnomic will and the liberal account of man are homologous, the political eschatology of liberalism – e.g., Fukuyama’s end of history – maintains an anthropology in which the gnomic will exhausts the concept of man.

The natural will is a form of resistance to the political eschatology of the gnomic will. The antagonism of natural and gnomic will lies in their respective conceptions of freedom. From the perspective of the natural will, the liberal politico-anthropology’s reduction of freedom to the perpetuation of individual choice subordinates the effect of freedom and, in consequence, trivialises freedom. The natural will, in contrast, entails a radical concept of freedom as the total transformation of cosmos. According to the logoi of an absolute truth and absolute ethics, natural will locates freedom in the break from and annihilation of the bonds of the (gnomic) fallen state of man, that is, in the theosis of soteriological, eschatological and apocalyptic transfiguration. The relevance of St. Maximus as political thinker follows from the depth of his Chalcedonian Christology; the distinction between the natural and gnomic will marks a distinction in anthropological and, in the last instance, cosmological visions.

The Metaphysics of θέλημα in Maximus the Confessor: Discussing Possible Transcendental Themes

Dr Cullan Joyce

This paper gives a speculative reading of Maximus’ discussion of the ontological consequences of the obedience of Christ’s human and divine Wills (θέλημαzet) in terms of how Christ’s actions at Gethsemane (PG 91:65A-68D) and the transform created natures (PG 91:1304D-1316A, particularly 1308B-C). To supplement these discussions I interpret a subtle distinction he makes between Ousia, Physis and Energeia in PG 90:1084A-1085A to argue that these types of distinctions show that Maximus intends on making a progressively deeper explication of the order of existence. I argue that this indicates Maximus is attempting something similar to a transcendental move from which it becomes possible to conceive of the content and effects on the existential order of life. I argue that Maximus articulates, with unique ambition, the creativity implicit in the locale of intentional acts and also provides a compelling argument for this locale’s dependence upon divine gratuity as external to the natural order. This addition generates a formidable conception of the conditions of human freedom, which allows both internal innovation in creation, but also a higher, gratuitous innovation. After discussing these themes, I illustrate Maximus relevance to an important figure in contemporary philosophy by drawing a brief distinction between his presentation and one part of Schelling’s articulation in Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom (Freiheitsschrift (common abbrv.)). Here Schelling identifies eternity as that condition of innovative potentiality which is beyond the scope of distinctions between being and ground of being. I argue that despite Schelling’s significant advancing of the question in which the eternal features as a constant innovation of all posterior to it, the absence of externalised comprehension of divine gratuity makes these innovations relate through forms of created intentionality. Schelling’s account of nature is therefore closer to an enclosed system which is capable of infinite variations. This is in contrast to Maximus’ unified two-fold ontology, in which: 1) the radical difference of divine external gratuity expresses itself as eternal innovation which, by remaining gratuitous, conditions 2) created intentions to expressing infinite internal innovations.
Philosophical basis of Maximus’ concept of the sexes. The reasons and purposes of the distinction between a woman and a man

Like many other topics the distinction between a woman and a man occurs in Maximus’ writings as a part of a total vision of the cosmos. On one side, it is strongly connected to such theological problems as the original sin and eschatological vision, and on the other, with Maximus’ understanding of human nature and the cosmos as the microanthropos, which are philosophical ideas. In my paper I would like to present that Confessor strongly links sex determination to the ancestral sin and points out (similarly to Gregory of Nyssa) that without it human nature would not experience the division between male and female. Maximus the Confessor points out that Adam’s sin totally changed the manner of human nature’s existence, which is proliferated via procreation connected with sensual pleasure. Despite passibility, corruption of will and death, which are directly associated with human nature, there are other consequences of Adam’s sin that involve the entire universe. These are five divisions which destroy the harmony of the cosmos (the division between male and female, created and uncreated, sensual and intelligible, earth and heaven, settled world and heaven).

In the eschatological vision of Maximus, all divisions should vanish, especially division between male and female. It is particularly interesting how Maximus manages to reconcile this vision with his conviction about a human being as a complete nature (the union of body and soul). It seems that for Maximus gender has an accidental nature and as many other ”functions” will vanish in eschatological life.
Maximus the Confessor and the Consciousness of Time
Rev. Dr. Joshua Lollar
University of Kansas (USA)

The question of the status of the world with respect to eternity and time was one of the fundamental dividing points between pagan and Christian philosophers in late antiquity. Almost without exception, pagan philosophers held that the world is eternal, at least on the basic level of matter, whereas Christians, almost without exception, held that the world was created out of nothing. In Ambiguum 10, Maximus the Confessor gives a long, slowly developing argument against the eternity of matter. This paper attempts to draw Maximus’ thinking into contact with modern phenomenology, particularly Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness, in order to explore one way in which Maximus’ thought may be allowed to speak to contemporary philosophy. As an argument within the context of ancient logic and metaphysics, Maximus’ reasoning with respect to the question of the eternity of the world is not as strong as that of some of his predecessors, particularly Philoponus. Within the specific context of the Ambigua, however, where Maximus’ concerns give, I argue, the beginnings of an analysis of consciousness and pathos, the description is much more incisive, a point that phenomenology helps to uncover.
In this paper I propose that virtue, for St Maximus the Confessor, has ontological status by merit of its participation in love. My interest in asking what a virtue is for Maximus arises from the recent papers that present him as relevant to the field of contemporary virtue ethics (Louth, Blowers, Papanikolaou). I think the ontology of virtue as held by Maximus may well be a particular asset to this field. I posit that virtue is something we can consider to be real only in lieu of it being an activity partaking in love. The way virtues partake in love is explained in this paper through Maximus’ description of the logoi and Logos. I posit that the relationship of virtue to love is identical to that of the logoi and the Logos, and that in explicitly making this claim we can make radical and more clear statements about what virtue is for Maximus and what is meant by its participation in love. We can for example, reconcile it with the circle and radii image that Cvetkovic proposed be used as an analogy for the arrangement and movement of the logoi in St Maximus’ works. This paper therefore has two related purposes: firstly, to establish that virtue for Maximus has ontological status by merit of its participation in love, and secondly, to establish the former premise by identifying the relationship of the Logos and logoi with that of love and virtue.
Nicholas Marinides, Universität Basel, Theologie

Maximus the Confessor and the care of souls

Maximus the Confessor wrote frequently to high secular officials of the Byzantine state. Recent research has studied this correspondence as a component of his struggle on behalf of Chalcedonian dyothelete theology against various opposing doctrines. But the element of spiritual guidance in these letters is often overlooked. Maximus in fact stands in a long line of philosophers engaged in teaching and advising those in power, which was one of the most ubiquitous tasks of philosophy in the Greek and especially the Roman world. He uses certain elements of the Greco-Roman tradition of Seelenführung—such as Stoic terminology regarding kathêkonta and ta eph'hêmin, as well as mental exercises designed to train oneself to remember one’s place in the cosmos—but adapts them and reinterprets them for a Christian context. I will focus my presentation on these elements in Maximus’s Epistles, turning to his Treatise on the Lord’s Prayer and Centuries on Love for the spiritual and psychological theory that underlies his advice. Thus I will show how he develops the role of the ancient teacher of the soul in a Christian mode. As a corollary I will also consider how the sophisticated philosophical pedigree of this form of guidance relates to the Christian practice of spiritual fatherhood developed initially in monastic contexts.
Relation as marker of historicity in the thought of St. Maximos Confessor

Dr. Smilen Markov (Veliko Turnovo)

The Christocentric re-interpretation of Dionysian thought by Maximos establishes Christology as the central metaphysical concept, from which the methods of ontology and gnoseology are derived. As history gains importance, in contrast to the intellectual standards of neo-Platonism, movement transcends the circumstances of the individual existential trajectory and expresses the inner depths of being. Maximos interprets the concepts, characterizing movement and peace, namely Aristotle’s categories, as the pattern of being-with-God (Capita theologica et polemica, Ad Marinum), whereas for the Capadocians they are only holographic markers of created things. Although divine being is beyond any relations, the essential divine energy interacts with the world through a unifying relation, its principle being the Body of the incarnate Son of God. Created essences are relational not because they are bound to return to God, but as they are led from being to divinized, i.e. good, being (Mystagogia). Divinization takes place in a relational union, the later bearing the connotation of encounter, rather than of causal change. The category “relation” is applicable to the life of the Trinity, as well as to God’s activity in the world. All these relations are polyadic; unlike polyadicity in Scholasticism, the participants are boundaries and not subjects of relations. This concept of polyadicity has special gnoseological relevance: human sole internalizes contingent relations by overcoming the temporal and local divisions and uniting the principles (λόγοι) of all essences. The structure of this gnoseological unification follows the epistemological order of human knowledge, but its scope transcends the natural capacity of man. Internalizing the relations is for Maximos adding historicity to the inner depths of human soul, revealing at the same time the formats of divinized existence. Through the virtues man becomes mature enough, so as to unite all things in love-relations and bring them to the Son of God, who became man in person (Ambigua). Thus relations explicate the role of human person in the plot of Christ’s incarnation; they are a manifestation of man’s freedom in Christ. This anthropological dimension shows that in Maximos’ thought practical philosophy has the status of transcendental science. His concept of relation is a step forward in the attempts – strongly present in the commentary tradition of Aristotle (Porphyrius, Plotinus and Olympiodoros) – to integrate all types of relations (potential and actual, unilateral and reciprocal) into one coherent system.
The six-category ontology of Saint Maximus the Confessor

Abstract

Everyone accepts that one of the major contributions by a philosopher is a theory of existence, i.e., an ontology. Questions about the genesis and structure of central concepts in Patristics have always been addressed, but a general picture of what are the building blocks that can form a Patristic ontology still waits to be produced. The aim of this paper is to show that it is in the works of Saint Maximus the Confessor (580-662) that we can find a full-fledged theory of existence. The thesis championed in this work is that the ontology of St. Maximus, which I take to be representative also for the entire Greek Patristic thinking, is made of six main ontological categories: logos, nature/essence (φύσις), power (δύναμις), activity/operation (ἐνέργεια), hypostasis and mode of being (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως) and acting. Some of these concepts have been partly analyzed in various ways in recent scholarship, but not a full account of them, of their strong interrelatedness and especially of their full ontological relevance has been given so far. This project proposes a description and reconstruction of each of these categories and their relationship as they appear in Maximus’ works, especially in Ambiguum and the antimonothelite writings. An emphasis will be put on the concepts of dunamis and mode, which I claim, represent Maximus original contributions to ontology. I will argue that Maximus takes dunamis as a central concept in the definition of essence or nature of each being and hence I will show this notion plays a central role not only for the Maximian theology but also for his ontology. Moreover, I will hold, contrary to main scholarship, that the way Maximus uses dunamis shows this term is more related to ancient medicine than to Aristotle. I will also give evidence for some Stoic roots for the notion of mode (tropos) and show the remarkable shift Maximus made by endowing this term originally restricted in the Stoic theory of action to portraying the individual way of acting, with an ontological meaning. I will finally present one of many possible applications of this ontology, this time referring to the interpretation of miracles and laws of nature in Maximus’ thought. As it will come up, this Maximian six-category ontology will provide us with the tools for reconstructing the relationship between miracles and laws of nature in terms of relations of ontological dependence, where miracles can be coherently interpreted as both preserving and overcoming the laws of nature.

Keywords: Maximus the Confessor, ontology, logos, nature/essence (φύσις), power (δύναμις), activity/operation (ἐνέργεια), hypostasis, mode of being (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως) and acting, miracles, laws of nature, ontological dependence.

Dr. Sebastian Mateiescu
University of Bucharest
Time, Aeon, Ever-Moving Repose: A Threefold Theory of Temporality

This paper is an exposition of Maximus the Confessor’s (580-662 AD) understanding of temporality. Maximus the Confessor’s theology constitutes a philosophical ‘system’, a philosophical Weltanschauung with a particularly unique ontology. There is neither a systematic treatment on the subject of time by Maximus nor an articulated ‘theory of time’ in his works. However, scattered remarks on time can be traced in his writings; remarks that point to a unique and distinct understanding of temporality’s nature. Ensuing an introduction to the Aristotelian theory of motion and time, we will proceed to unfold Maximus’ radical innovation thereof, Maximus’ own theory of motion as returning motion and to his understanding of time (χρόνος) as a spatiotemporal continuum. Our conclusion is that Maximus acknowledges three distinct modes of temporality, i.e. time (χρόνος), the Aeon (αἰών) and the radical transformation of temporality and motion in the ever-moving repose (στάσεως ἀεικήνητος). With these three distinct modes of temporality, a unique Maximian theory of time can be reconstructed. In this theory, time is not merely measuring ontological motion, but it rather measures a relationship, the consummation of which effects the transformation of time into a dimensionless present devoid of temporal, spatial and generally ontological distance – thereby manifesting a perfect communion-in-otherness.
The Liturgical Constitution of Creation in a Phenomenological Interpretation of St Maximus the Confessor’s Mystagogy

Alexei V. Nesteruk

University of Portsmouth, UK and St. Andrew’s Biblical Theological Institute, Moscow, Russia

Abstract

The paper places St Maximus the Confessor’s thought in the context of modern phenomenological discussion of the issue of “creation of the world”. By overcoming M. Heidegger’s claim that a biblical response to a metaphysical question about the provenance of beings is irrelevant, we argue, in similarity with J.-L. Marion’s approach to reading of St. Augustine, that creation does not belong to the lexicon of beings, but to the liturgical vocabulary which acknowledges, establishes, that is, constitutes “it”. We elucidate the sense of St. Maximus’ idea of “makroanthropos” by discussing the issue of man’s commensurability with creation through the Eucharistic offering of the world treating it phenomenologically as the constitutive synthesis of the world as a whole. Love for God through liturgical-like mediation between divisions in creation leads to the total synthesis of mankind in which every individual exchanges its own being not only with other human beings, but with the whole material universe. It is this love that allows one to “see” the entire universe through the eyes of the Logos himself. Correspondingly the Cosmic Liturgy performed through mediation between divisions in creation can be interpreted as a particular way of constituting creation through its offering to God. A sheer consubstantiality with the world, being an irremediable premise for any constitution of creation, is thus consummated by love towards God, so that the extensional temporality and spatial distances of different parts of the world are reduced to their infinite and living synthesis of the “now” of the human existence with God. The Cosmic Liturgy cascades towards a philosophical and even scientific “Eucharist” as an act of thanksgiving. Indeed since love assumes dispassionate acceptance of the world, it teaches one how to look at it from a distance, that is to retain a “bare objective idea” of the universe through separation from passions and temptations (for example, from an anxiety and depression of our contingent and miniscule location in the universe). When modern cosmology produces ideas of the universe, it attempts to remove any attachments to basic existential concerns, but having remained a product of human constitution full of motivations arising from passions, it cannot achieve divine knowledge of the universe. In this sense the true “knowledge” of creation remains an eschatological task of knowing God, for whom the universe is not God. According to Maximus knowledge of creation is achievable through an instantaneous synthesis of the liturgical act. Then the impasse of the actual “present” of this act makes it possible to recapitulate the sense of the past and future of the universe, their ultimate consummation in the unconditional love of God at the creation.
Otherwise than Identity, or Beyond Difference: St. Maximus the Confessor and the hypostatic-transfigurement of fundamental ontology

Following Yannaras’ appropriation of negative theology as a point of dialogue between the Orthodox theological tradition and contemporary philosophy, I propose to locate in the philosophy of St. Maximus a remarkable concern for the temporality, finitude and historicity of the human soul, that at once anticipates Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology,” but which is also capable of overcoming the limitations of philosophical nihilism. In taking seriously Heidegger’s claim that the recovery of ontology (and philosophy itself) depends upon the understanding of Being always in relation to its self-revelation in the finite and historical reality of human existence, as “Being-towards-death,” it becomes clear that the full depths of philosophy, as achieved in modernity, hinges upon a turning away from the symphonic unity of finite beings and eternal Being as recognized by the ancients, and its being unveiled anew in a profound and subjective negativity. Being is therefore, now to be understood as ontological difference, made present in anxiety before the nothingness undergirding all things.

However, the possibility that recognizes in such radical negation only the impotence of an understanding that would seek for the truth of our most intimate, existential reality under the name of an “ontology” (no matter how fundamental), and that such an impotence always already points beyond itself, allows for a renewal of the radical ἀπόφασις which lies at the heart of Byzantine thought. In contrast to his Neo-Platonic forebears, St. Maximus the Confessor presents a mode of thinking which surpasses nihilism, not through a denial of human particularity or finitude, but rather through a transformation of the very categories of Being and non-being themselves through his conception of Divine personhood. For Maximus this personhood is conceived of as transcending both Being and time, and yet without any loss of transcendence comes also to partake fully of both Being and time through the mystery of the Incarnation. By virtue of this mystery, human existence and activity comes to reciprocate the eternal and the Divine, elevating the very being of mankind to a fully ontological participation in divinity. That is, the Divine comes to actualize himself, as a finite and historical being, becoming a particular “being towards death.” According to Maximus, this be-coming forever transfigures the sphere of beings, bringing the historical into the transcendent, non-Being into Being, and death into life.
The Soul-Body Problem in Late Antiquity: Maximus’ re-working of Nemesius’ Neoplatonic attempted solution

Marius Portaru

Abstract:

Platonic philosophers in later Antiquity, such as Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as their Christian heirs as Nemesius of Emesa, tried to offer a better account of the relationship between soul and body than Plato has given them. The problem about Plato’s soul-body dualism, as the Stoics rushed to point out, was that it assumed some way in which the corporeal could intelligibly be said to associate with the incorporeal to form a single substance, a man, who is consequently a metaphysical unity. According to the Stoics, such a unity could only be achieved by the unification of strictly material substances, which led to the conclusion that soul must be a material substance. Plotinus and Porphyry take up to answer the Stoic criticism. Around 400 AD, the Christian Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, appropriates Porphyry’s solution, but without being aware of its insufficiencies. What is more, his psychological doctrine is partially complicated by Origenian presuppositions. Though Maximus the Confessor praised Nemesius for his philosophical acumen (PG 91, 277), his solution to the soul-body problem is significantly different – and better philosophically – than Nemesius’, but not completely independent of it. My paper undertakes to explore the relationship between Nemesius and Maximus, and to analyse the structure of Maximus’ solution.
Abstract

Although the similarities between the trial of Socrates and the trial of Jesus have been discussed since the age of the Apologists, the same cannot be said about the anonymously written “Trial of Maximus the Confessor” and Plato's *Apology*. My paper seeks to start this discussion. First, I look at the historical context of each trial, finding that each was preceded by a rebellion that the accused was suspected of inciting (the thirty tyrants’ in one, the Exarch Gregory's in the other). Second, I turn to the defense speeches of both Socrates and Maximus to reveal a layer of duplicity endemic to the text: while both Socrates and Maximus appear to exonerate themselves, their defense speeches also contain harsh mockeries of their accusers. Third, I elucidate the consanguinity between the defendants' opposition to their cities' god(s), whom they feel compelled to reject, and their introduction of new gods into their cities (the god of reason and the Christ of Dyothelitism) — crimes for which both defendants were tragically convicted. Finally, I discuss how both documents provide paradigms for how future philosophers and theologians should act in relation to the city.
The philosophical significance of the dialectic between reason (logos), mode (tropos) and end (telos) in a postmodern context. (Abstract)

In our paper we will present how the thought of St Maximus the Confessor (580-662) could be viewed as a peculiar dialectic between the concepts of logos, mode (tropos) and end (telos). The logos means God’s will for nature and constitutes a direction towards its eschatological fulfillment. The term tropos denotes the historical activations of nature in dialogue with its logos and in view to its eschatological end. The telos consists in the hypostatic union of the created and the uncreated in Christ. This union starts in History but its full ontological consequences are manifested in the eschata. We speak of a “dialectic” because these are concepts that are not defined statically, but through a “dialogue” between them. We shall thus try to express Maximian thought as a very original dialectical contemplation. The latter presents interesting similarities but also differences with the corresponding effort that took place in the West beginning with Augustine and reaching up to Hegel and post-Hegelian thought through the intermediary of scholastic philosophy. In Maximus, the logos cannot be defined independently, but only as a direction to the eschatological end, which nevertheless needs a historical mode in order to be existentially realized. This implies a dynamical metaphysics of the “way” (dromos), where nature does not exist statically by itself, but is formed progressively and dynamically. The tropos constitutes an activation of nature by man in dialogue with its logos, the latter being distinct from nature in itself. The mode (tropos) cannot be reified either, but is defined dialectically on the one hand in relation with the logos, and, on the other, to the end of the metaphysical itinerary. The telos is also defined dialectically. It is not just the last episode of a linear evolution of time; on the contrary, it is present already in the beginning in order to attract the whole itinerary of nature to itself.

Some questions that will occupy us further in relation to Maximus as a dialectical philosopher are the following: i) What is the relation between Maximian eschatology and Aristotelian teleology? ii) Is tropos just a fulfillment and activation of natural potentialities or is it also their frustration, that is their “crucifixion” in a theological language? What does this antimony mean for dialectical thought? iii) What is the philosophical significance of the fact that the metaphysical telos is identified with the events of Incarnation and Resurrection that are “above nature” (“ὑπὲρ φύσιν’)? Can metaphysics be reconciled with theology proper? iv) Are we entitled to regard Maximus as a precursor of G.W.F. Hegel, as is insinuated by Hans-Urs von Balthasar? What are the differences from Hegelian dialectics? v) Do we find in Maximus something similar to the theory of “felix culpa”? vi) Can we formulate a comparison between Maximian dialectics and those that we encounter in Post-Hegelian and post-modern thought, such as in Lacanian psychoanalysis and its transformation by Slavoj Zižek? vii) The Maximian notion of “gnome” and a comparison with what might be termed as
trauma in psychoanalysis or the assumption of mortality and finitude in phenomenology.

viii) Possible applications of Maximian thought for a theory of gender (comparison with Judith Butler) or a theory of nation (comparison with Homi Bhabha).
Maximus the Confessor and al-Farabi on imagination

Maximus’ the Confessor epistemology was influenced, besides Christian thought, by Aristotelian, Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy. According to Maximus, imagination has a significant role in sensation. While Aristotle discerns imagination, sensation and intellection as cognitive functions, Maximus frequently combines them and refers to sensible imagination (φαντασία αἰσθητική). Imagination is relation (σχέσις) and not process; it connects imaginative (φανταστικός) and imagined (φανταστός), while their interaction creates imageries (φαντάσματα). Mind perceives sensibles through imagination. Maximus holds that imageries do not consist true and indisputable knowledge. Imagination is an inferior way of knowing in comparison to apprehension (κατάληψις), since it is the latter which connects beings and discloses their interrelation. Imagination is the first step towards the intelligibles. Truth lays in the logoi of beings. There are several indications that al-Farabi (870-950) and Maximus the Confessor share common insights because they resort to the same ancient sources and ps. Dionysius the Areopagite. According to al-Farabi, imagination functions as a bridge between perception and reason. As R. Walzer indicates, imagination preserves the impressions that sense perception makes upon it. In addition imagination connects or separates imageries so as to produce true or false interpretations of sense experiences within the soul. Imagination permits humans to perform cognitive activities even during their sleep. A few selected humans are able to be connected with the higher faculty of reason, even in a waking state, with the aid of imagination. These are the prophets, who attain knowledge of a higher level. Prophets attain knowledge through imagination, while philosophers through revelation within theoretical and practical reason. Philosophers possess supreme knowledge and they are capable of govern the state, while prophets are not adequate for such a task. In this paper, I attempt to present and analyze the way Maximus the Confessor and al-Farabi deals with imagination in order to better assess their approaches.
One of the most distinctive features of Maximus Confessor is his methodological approach; neither unconditionally theological, neither philosophical underprivileged. Among the many extant writings of Maximus Confessor, Epistula VI (PG 91, 424C-433A) offers a unique access to this methodological characteristic. Written only with the help of “natural reason” for a particular request of John of Cyzicus (i.e. to respond to the question “if the soul is incorporeal”), but questioning the theological differences between the Creator and creatures, Epistula VI makes possible to discern a genuine methodological approach of Maximus Confessor or lack, thereof.

This paper attempts to call into question Maximus’ philosophical approach with regard to a possible theological disclosure. The main argumentation is constructed as part of Epistula VI methodological and hermeneutic analyses. Two other texts are taken into account for further evidence, ‘Ambigua to John’ and ‘Opusculum de anima’.

The paper argues that, although, Epistula VI is a genuine philosophical work, nevertheless, due to its contextual and hermeneutical implications the letter presents some theological premises (as the refutation of Origenism). In this regard, the present paper advocates for a theological disclosing inside Maximus’ philosophical approach. The paper concludes that Epistula VI is one of the basic instances that presents Maximus’ methodological approach rather as a hermeneutical reconsideration than an analytical division.
The luminous garment of Christ and the uncreated, enhypostatic light.

Maximus a pre-Palamitic Palamist? (From Ambiguum to Triades - deification as enhypostatic and direct illumination)

Phd. Lecturer Nichifor Tănase[1]
“Eftimie Murgu” University of Reşiţa

In the first part of the study we analyze the relationship between logoi and energeia (the intentional or “logical” energeia or the ontology of divine energy as ontological “logic”) within the maximian cosmology and palamite theology. The concept of reasons for St. Maximus play a role similar in many respects to that of energy (energeiai) in Cappadocian Fathers (D. Bradshaw), but the functional similarity it should not lead to the identification rationales with the energies. But, because the St Maximus’ development of the doctrine of divine essence and activities is largely equivalent to the teaching of St Gregory Palamas, it could be highly tempting to describe the path from the Cappadocians via Maximus to Gregory Palamas as a teleological development towards a natural conclusion (T. Tollefsen). From the works of Gregory it is easy to see that the primary sense of energeia is activity. The energeia, he says, is ‘the essential motion of nature’. This resounds with Maximian terminology (Palamas, Triads 3.2.6 and 7; cf. Maximus, Cap. gnost. 1.48).

In the second part of this study, we will analyses the Maximus’ influence on Palamas and the direct references in which Palamas employs Maximus’ definitions describing the reciprocal perichoresis into the process of the divinisation. Therefore Maximian idea of a dyophysite reciprocity (onto-tropological) between God and man (Ambiguum, 10) is the key to his soteriology (L. Thunberg). The Denys’ notion of a „theandric energy” becomes his preferred expression of the divine-human reciprocity in action. The goal of the Incarnation is precisely to make possible a communion between energies, which alone can bring into being the divinization that is the final goal of human life. Christology gives to the divine energies the soteriological dimension. The divine activity penetrates into the human nature of Christ, but this nature is preserved, secured by its natural logos in God. What is changed is the so-called ‘mode’ of being, or the way of mutual interpenetration. Palamas comes to a definition proper of theosis who is actually a quotation from Maximus (Thalas. 61, PG 90, 636C, and from the Scholia 6, PG 90, 644C). „Deification is an enhypostatic and direct illumination which has no beginning”, „a mystical union with God beyond intellect and reason”; deification is also „the symbol of the authentic and real adoption, according to the gift and grace of the Holy Spirit” (Triads III. 1.28). Gregory calls the light seen on Mount Tabor ‘enhypostatic’, i.e. without any hypostasis of its own (Triad III.1.28). For its hypostasis is Christ; he himself is the deifying light (Triads III.1.16). The deifying light pertains to God’s essence but is not itself the essence of God.

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Man as co-creator: reflections on the theological insights of St Maximus the Confessor within a contemporary interdisciplinary context

Stoyan Tanev (Odense, Denmark & Sofia, Bulgaria)

In a discussion of St Maximus’ understanding of the *logoi* as “predeterminations and divine acts of will”, David Bradshaw points out that such understanding could explain St Maximus’ claim that God knows creatures “as His own acts of will.”¹ He also points out that according to St Maximus rational creatures are deified insofar as they move and act in accordance with their *logoi* and it is actually the free choice of human beings that makes them move either toward the state of full being that is the Creator’s intent or toward the non-being. Bradshaw refers to the interpretation of Alexander Golitzin’s work on Dionysius the Areopagite where he has seen the human movement in accordance with the *logoi* as a way for human beings to become their own co-creators.² He also refers to Jean-Claude Larchet who provides a similar reading of the *Ambigua* 7 (1080BC, 1084B and 1084D).³

St Maximus offers multiple occasions for such interpretations pointing out that by his ascetic efforts and by following the commandments every man is becoming co-worker in the plan of his own salvation. For example, in the Ascetic Life (42) he emphasizes: “See, the Lord bestowed on us the method of salvation and has given us eternal power to become sons of God. So finally our salvation is in our will’s grasp.”⁴ For St Maximus the Incarnation is the ultimate goal of both creation and Deification. On the other hand Salvation and Deification converge in the works of Holy Trinity as part of the economy of Salvation which each of us has to approach freely and personally by following the Divine commandments, ascetic efforts and participation the Church Sacraments.

The text will offer some more systematic reflections on the suggested theme by referring to the theological contributions of Fr. George Florovsky, Fr. Dumitru Staniloae, as well as on the recent works of Fr. Nicholas Loudovikos and Georgi Kapriev. It will also make a parallel to ongoing research in the natural and the social sciences which seems to be in the process of rediscovering the co-creative role of human beings within the context of a completely secular eschatological vision.

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² Hieromonk Alexander Golitzin, *Et Introibo Ad Altare Dei. The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with Special Reference to its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition*, Thessaloniki, 1994, p. 86: “The *logoi* are therefore our personal and foreordained vocations to which we may or may not choose to become conformed, or better – since they remain transcendent by virtue of their source in God – to which we may choose to be ever in process of becoming conformed in order thus to share, as it were, in the eternal process of our own creation.”
It is often held that the greatest challenge to a systematic metaphysics is the passage from the intelligible to the sensible world, where contingency, materiality and evil appear to disrupt any order and necessity we can detect in nature. The first attempts at an idealist deduction of being lie in the Neoplatonic reading of the second half of Plato’s Parmenides as a proof that all reality proceeds from the One, as found, for instance, in Proclus. In the latter’s philosophy the derivation of the sensible world occurs gradually, the many structures that make it up being deduced one-by-one, but the decisive turning point occurs with Time, understood not as an extension, but as a transcendent science or intellect of change, which determines the proper measures of change for all cosmic participants in the forms, with a view to fashioning the world order into a perpetual receptacle, capable of expressing the infinite possibilities contained within the intelligible paradigms. This transition to the sensible world is bound up with a commitment to the perfection of the present world and an iconic correspondence between this world and the intelligible. Such an axiom greatly restricts Proclus’ natural philosophy and its ability to explain the natural world. Maximus the Confessor, on the other hand, possesses a Christian theory of transcendent time, which differs from those of the Neoplatonists in significant respects, in particular in seeing the world not ordered to its own perpetuity, but to an eschatological reality, a world to come, which indeed will have no end. I propose to discuss Maximus’ theory of transcendent time, how it improves upon Proclus’ and the solutions it suggests to the problem of the passage from the intelligible to the sensible for first philosophy.
**Hypostasis in Maximus: An Expression, A Term, A Theory**

The paper will outline the preliminary results of a complete inquiry into the usage of the word *hypostasis* and its cognates in Maximus the Confessor. Its scope is two-fold. On the one hand, the proponents want to create a “rational dictionary” of Maximus’ usage of key metaphysical terms, both within and without his Christological and Trinitarian discussions. On the other hand, they want to highlight the philosophical underpinnings and consequences of his terminological choices.

The conclusions of the paper will rely on a complete survey of the vocabulary of *hypostasis* in Maximus, compared to usages of *prosopon*, *atonon*, and their cognates, if they show up in the same contexts. The vocabulary study will be performed by Marcin Podbielski. His part of presentation will focus on (a) the linguistic and (b) the semantic aspects of Maximus’ usage of the vocabulary. A particular attention will be paid to distinguishing between the meanings assigned to the vocabulary under scrutiny, the actual reference of the words, both concrete and metaphorical, the linguistic register of Maximus’ word usage, and theoretical contexts in which the terms are used.

The second part of the presentation, by Anna Zhyrkova, will build on these results, as well as on the conclusions of her studies of Cyrillus, Leontius of Byzantium, and Leontius of Jerusalem. She will pay a particular attention to the relationship between the theological concerns of those authors and the philosophical implications of their terminological choices. Her study will be more focused on traditional theses discussed in relation with Christological and Trinitarian discussions, but her conclusions will bear more on what kind of views in individuation are implied by Maximus’ statements on *hypostasis*. 
Programme

[Note: Each short paper slot is comprised of a 20 min. presentation and a 10 min. discussion. Plenary sessions consist of a 30-35 min. presentation for each plenary speaker and a 30 min. discussion.]

DAY 1: Friday, September 26, 2014

15.00-16.00
Registration
At the Freie Universität Berlin’s Institut für Philosophie – Habelschwerdter Allee 30, 14195 Berlin
Christos Yannaras  
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy – Panteion University, Athens

**Why would Maximus be a European, why would the Confessor be a philosopher?**

Christophe Erismann  
SNFS Professor of Medieval Philosophy – University of Lausanne

**Maximus the Confessor and Aristotle**

16.00-17.30  
**Plenary Session**  
SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie

**Christos Yannaras**  
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy – Panteion University, Athens

**Why would Maximus be a European, why would the Confessor be a philosopher?**

**Christophe Erismann**  
SNFS Professor of Medieval Philosophy – University of Lausanne

**Maximus the Confessor and Aristotle**

17.30-17.45: Coffee Break

17.45-19.45  
**1.1: Parallel Sessions**

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<th>SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie</th>
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| 17.45-18.15: Ilias Papagiannopoulos (Univ. of Piraeus)  
At the edge of Modernity: Maximus Confessor as a ‘past that speaks as an oracle’  |
| 18.15-18.45: Sotiris Mitralexis (Freie Univ. Berlin)  
Time, Aeon, Ever-Moving Repose: A threefold theory of temporality  |
| 18.45-19.15: Joshua Lollar (Univ. of Kansas)  
Maximus the Confessor and the Consciousness of Time  |
| 19.15-19.45: Andreas Andreopoulos (Univ. of Winchester)  
Time as tropos: beyond the end of time  |
| 17.45-18.15: Elena Giannakopoulou (Univ. of Athens)  
Testimonies of Ecumenical Councils on St. Maximus the Confessor  |
| 18.15-18.45: George Arabatzis (Univ. of Athens)  
Maximus Confessor and Anna Comnena: The Presence of Maximus Confessor in the Alexiad  |
| 18.45-19.15: Michail Mantzanas (Univ. Ecclesiastical Academy of Athens)  
Aristotle's and Maximus the Confessor's Theory of Motion  |
| 19.15-19.45: George Steiris (Univ. of Athens)  
Maximus the Confessor and al-Farabi on imagination  |

20.00  
**Dinner**  
Ristorante Galileo  
Otto-von-Simson Straße 26 14195 Berlin
DAY 2: Saturday, September 27, 2014

10.00-11.30

**Plenary Session**
SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie

Andrew Louth  
*Em. Professor of Patristic and Byzantine Studies – Durham University*

Maximos’ distinction between logos and tropos and the ontology of the Person

Torstein Tollefsen  
*Professor of Philosophy – University of Oslo*

Whole and Part in the Metaphysics of St Maximus the Confessor

11.30-11.45: Coffee Break

11.45-13.15

2.1: Parallel Sessions

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11.45-12.15: Marcin Podbielski (Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie)  
**Hypostasis in Maximus: an Expression, a Term, a Theory - Part A**

12.15-12.45: Vladimir Cvetkovic (Univ. of Belgrade)  
**The Oneness of God as Unity of Persons in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor**

12.45-13.15: Smilen Markov (St. Cyril and St. Methodius Univ. of Veliko Tarnovo)  
**Relation as marker of historicity in the thought of St. Maximos Confessor**

11.45-12.15: Marius Portaru (Patristic Institute Augustinianum)  
**The Soul-Body Problem in Late Antiquity: Maximus’ re-working of Nemesius’ Neoplatonic attempted solution**

12.15-12.45: Michael Bakker (ACEOT - VU Amsterdam)  
**A Tale of Two Cities: the Tripartite Soul in Plato and St Maximos**

12.45-13.15: Nicholas Marinides (Univ. of Basel)  
**Maximus the Confessor and the care of souls**

13.15-14.45: Lunch Break
### 14.45-16.15
**Plenary Session**
SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie

**Fr. Maximos Constas**  
*Senior Research Scholar – Holy Cross, Brookline MA*

**Georgi Kapriev**  
*Professor of the History of Philosophy – Sv. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia*

**A Greater and More Hidden Word: Maximos the Confessor and the nature of language**

**The conceptual apparatus of Maximus the Confessor and contemporary anthropology**

16.15-16.30: Coffee Break

### 16.30-18.00
**2.2: Parallel Sessions**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie</th>
<th>SIR 2 – Institut für Philosophie</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair: Nikolaos Loudovikos</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chair: Dionysios Skliris</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>16.30-17.00:</strong> Anna Zhyrkova (Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie)</td>
<td><strong>16.30-17.00:</strong> Natalie Depraz (Université de Rouen)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hypostasis in Maximus: an Expression, a Term, a Theory - Part B</strong></td>
<td><strong>The philosophy of negation in Maximus the Confessor between negative theology and apophaticism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>17.00-17.30:</strong> Demetrios Harper (Univ. of Winchester)</td>
<td><strong>17.00-17.30:</strong> Antonio Vargas (Humboldt Univ. Berlin)</td>
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<td><strong>Autexousion as Assent or Actuality? Compatibilism, Natural Law, and the Maximian Synthesis</strong></td>
<td><strong>A Contribution of Maximus’ Theory of Time to First Philosophy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>17.30-18.00:</strong> Nevena Dimitrova (Charles University in Prague)</td>
<td><strong>17.30-18.00:</strong> Jack Pappas (Boston College)</td>
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<td><strong>Human Knowledge in St. Maximus the Confessor (What is wisdom and how hekasis and gnomi determine the way of human knowledge?)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Otherwise than Identity, or Beyond Difference: St. Maximus the Confessor and the hypostatic-transfiguration of fundamental ontology</strong></td>
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### 18.00-19.30
**Plenary Session**
SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie
DAY 3: Sunday, September 28, 2014

09.30-11.00
3.1: Parallel Sessions

SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie
Chair: Sotiris Mitralexis

09.30-10.00: Stoyan Tanev (Univ. of Southern Denmark)
Man as co-creator: reflections on the theological insights of St
Maximus the Confessor within a contemporary interdisciplinary
context

10.00-10.30: Dionisios Skliris (Univ. Paris IV-Sorbonne)
The philosophical significance of the dialectic between reason
(logos), mode (tropos) and end (telos) in a postmodern context

10.30-11.00: Alexei Nesteruk (Univ. of Portsmouth)
The Liturgical Constitution of Creation in a Phenomenological
Interpretation of St Maximus the Confessor’s Mystagogy

SIR 2 – Institut für Philosophie
Chair: Georgios Arabatzis

09.30-10.00: Cullan Joyce (MCD Univ. Melbourne)
The Metaphysics of Thelema in Maximus the Confessor: Discussing
Possible Transcendental Themes

10.00-10.30: Dorothy Chang (Columbia Univ.)
Freedom and Free Will through a Trinitarian and Christological
Lens in Maximus' Ambigua

10.30-11.00: Alexandru Szabo (KU Leuven)
Approaching philosophy, disclosing theology: Maximus Confessor’s
Epistula VI

11.00-11.15: Coffee Break
11:15-12.30
Plenary Session: Round table
SER 1 – Institut für Philosophie
Revisiting the Theology-Philosophy Divide

Chairs & Discussants: Sebastian Lalla & Sotiris Mitralexis (Freie Univ. Berlin)

Discussants:
Georgi Kapriev (Sv. Kliment Ohridski Univ. of Sofia)
Ilias Papagiannopoulos (Univ. of Piraeus)
Dionysios Skliris (Univ. Paris IV - Sorbonne)
Torstein Tollefsen (Univ. of Oslo)
Christos Yannaras (Panteion Univ., Athens)

12.30-14.30
3.2: Parallel Sessions

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<td>12.30-13.00: Douglas Auld Shepardson (Fordham Univ.) 13.00-13.30: Emma C J Brown (Durham Univ.) 13.30-14.00: Sebastian Mateiescu (Univ. of Bucharest) 14.00-14.30: Karolina Kochańczyk – Bonińska (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński Univ. in Warsaw)</td>
<td>12.30-13.00: Myroslav Hryshko (Ljubljana) 13.00-13.30: Michael Harrington (Duquesne Univ.) 13.30-14.00: Nichifor Tănase (Eftimie Murgu Univ. of Resita) 14.00-14.30: Dan Chitoiu (Alexandru Ioan Cuza Univ. of Iasi)</td>
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<td>Maximus and Socrates on Trial: a Historic-Literary Consanguinity of Rebellion</td>
<td>Political Eschatology of the Natural and Gnomic Will The Contemplation of Nature as Spiritual Exercise in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua The luminous garment of Christ and the uncreated, enhypostatic light. Maximus a pre-Palamitic Palamist? From Logos to Logoi: Maximus the Confessor as Key Figure in Shaping the European Idea of World’s Rationality</td>
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